Aspects Concerning the Relationship between the Head of State and the Constitutional Jurisdiction in Romania and France  by Verga, Crina Mihaela
 Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  92 ( 2013 )  1003 – 1010 
1877-0428 © 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Lumen Research Center in Social and Humanistic Sciences, Asociatia Lumen.
doi: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2013.08.791 
ScienceDirect
Lumen International Conference Logos Universality Mentality Education Novelty (LUMEN
2013)
Aspects Concerning the Relationship between the Head of State
and the Constitutional Jurisdiction in Romania and France
Crina Mihaela Vergaa *
a Lecturer Ph.D.Candidate, “Mihail Kogălniceanu” University from Iasi, Romania
Abstract
This paper is a study of comparative law which refers to the relationships between the head of state and the constitutional
jurisdiction in Romania and France. These relationships  are highlighted by multiple tasks or procedures involving both public
authorities: the appointment of judges at Constitutional Court; the referral to the contentious constitutional court for the
exercise the constitutionality control of the laws and others normative acts;  the control of compliance with the procedure for
the election of the President and validation its results; the control of compliance with the procedure for organizing and
conducting the referendum and the confirmation of its results; settlement of constitutional legal conflicts between public
authorities. The comparative method reveals both the similarities between the two institutions from the states under review as
well as the differences determined by the manner in which the relationships between the President and the constitutional
jurisdiction are regulated.
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1. Introduction
This paper is a study of comparative law focused on the relationships between the head of state and the
constitutional jurisdiction in Romania and France. These are outlined by multiple attributions or procedures
involving the two public authorities: appointment of judges from the court of constitutional litigation, notification
of the court of constitutional litigation in view of exercising the control of law constitutionality as well as of other
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normative acts; the control of compliance with the procedure for the election of the President and validation of
results of presidential elections; control of compliance with the procedure for the organization and performance
of the referendum and confirmation  of its outcome; settlement of legal conflicts of a constitutional nature
between public authorities.
The comparative method reveals not only existing similarities between the two institutions in the states
under scrutiny, but also differences, determined by the way of regulating the relationships between the President
and the court of constitutional jurisdiction.
2. Appointment of judges from the court of constitutional litigation
The relationships between Romania’s President and Romania’s Constitutional Court are determined by
the legal and constitutional framework regulating these public authorities.
Romania’s President appoints 3 out of the 9 judges of the Constitutional Court. There has been criticism
against this disposition, on the grounds that there can be no objectivity on the part of the 3 judges appointed by
the President in case of referral to the Constitutional Court of the proposition to suspend the President. However,
the Constitutional Court has ruled that the democratic legitimacy of the constitutionality control “derives from the
selection or appointment of the constitutional judges exclusively by constitutional authorities elected directly by
the people” (The Lower House, Senate, President of Romania)" (Decision no. 1,1995).
In France, the President appoints 3 out of the 9 judges of the Constitutional Council and also appoints its
president (art. 56 of the Constitution). Through exercising this attribution, the head of state has influenced, in a
small degree, the future orientations of the body of constitutional jurisdiction. We believe that at the moment of a
constitutional revision it would be advisable that the constitutional judges should have a high legal qualification,
an established condition in the fundamental acts of the EU member states. Before exercising their mandate, the
appointed members of the Constitutional Council take a vow in front of the President.
According to the last line of article 13 of the fundamental act modified in 2008, the President’s
appointments are subject to approval of the permanent competent commission of each House of the Parliament
and the President cannot make the appointment when the total number of contrary votes from each commission
reaches at least three fifths of the votes expressed within the two commissions (art. 13, line 4).
On the occasion of the Constitution’s revision in 2008 (Loi constitutionnelle n° 2008-724, 2008), a
series of modifications was made concerning the members of the Constitutional Council, who will include the
former Presidents of the Republic – for life, as statutory members – beside the 9 judges (art. 56, line 3). This new
regulation has no solid legal ground and can be challenged easily, as the former heads of state have no legal
training in the field but only a certain political experience in the exercise of government, which can influence the
Council’s decisions at a given moment.
3. Notification of the court of constitutional litigation in view of exercising the control of the
constitutionality of laws and other normative acts
According to art. 146 letter a) of the Constitution, Romania’s President may notify the Constitutional
Court in view of exercising the control of constitutionality of laws prior to their promulgation. According to the
same regulation, the President’s initiative to revise the Constitution disposed at the Government’s suggestion will
be subject ex officio to the constitutionality control exercised by the Constitutional Court. To this sense, based on
art. 19 line 1 of Law 47/1992 revised, the Constitutional Court is bound to give a verdict on the constitutionality
of the revision initiative within 10 days.
In its jurisprudence, the constitutional court has defined its role of verifying the conformity of the law
with the Constitution, stipulating that: “the constitutionality control is not a hindrance to democracy, but its
necessary instrument, as it allows the parliamentary minority and the citizens to check the compliance with the
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Constitution’s provisions, providing a necessary balance to the parliamentary majority, should it turn aside from
the letter and spirit of the Constitution” (Decision no.1, 1995).
Similarly, the constitutionality control is an efficient way of protecting the Constitution, which the
President may use when deviations from the regulations of the fundamental law are identified.
In the French political regime, prior to the promulgation of laws, the head of state may appeal to the
Constitutional Council to check their conformity with the Constitution (art. 61 line 2). The constitutionality
control will be exercised ex officio by the court of constitutional litigation on all bills initiated by the President
and subject to referendum (art. 61, line 1), prior to the organization of the latter, according to art. 11 of the
fundamental law. In case of non-constitutionality of the acts, these cannot be promulgated nor enforced. They are
repealed starting with the date of publication of the Council’s decisions in the Official Gazette and no further
appeal can be made. The decisions of the constitutional court are not subject to appeal. They apply to all public
authorities and to the administrative and legal authorities (art. 62).
In France, the Constitutional Council has outlined explicitly in its jurisprudence the means of execution
on the part of the President of the decisions of the Constitutional Council to repeal partially a law, in agreement
with the legislation on the matter in force. Thus, the Constitutional Council has settled that “the object of the
constitutional control…when a law was not declared in full as contrary to the Constitution is to allow its
promulgation either after the removal of the dispositions declared as non-conforming with the Constitution or
after their replacement with new dispositions, in agreement with the fundamental act”» (Décision du Conseil
Constitutionnel no. 85-197, 1985). In practice, the execution by the President of the decisions of the
constitutional court was carried out in different ways, non-conforming with the fundamental act in certain
situations, which triggered criticism on behalf of the specialists in the field.
In Andorra as well, the French President – as head of state – has the attribution of notifying the
Constitutional Court in view of exercising the preventive and abstract control of constitutionality of a law (art. 98
letter b) corroborated with art. 46 pct. 1, letter g) of Andorra’s Constitution).
In the same context, according to art 54 of the French Constitution, the President may notify the
Constitutional Council in view of exercising a constitutional control of an international commitment. If the latter
contains a clause that is contrary to the Constitution following the constitutionality control, the authorization of
the ratification or approval of the international agreement may only be carried out after the revision of the
Constitution. In practice, the head of state has rarely made use of this procedure, of a particular importance in the
period of cohabitation.
As head of state in Andorra, the French President has the attribution of requesting the Constitutional
Court to make a previous control of the constitutionality of international treaties, prior to their ratification. In the
event a treaty is pronounced non-conforming with the provisions off the fundamental law, it cannot be ratified.
Similarly, if following the constitutionality control an international treaty is found to contain clauses contrary to
the Constitution, it cannot be subject to ratification until the revision of the supreme law (art. 101 corroborated
with art. 46 pct. 1, letter f) of Andorra’s Constitution).
4. The control of compliance with the procedure for the President’s election and validation of the result of
presidential elections
According to art. 82 corroborated with art. 146 letter f) of the Constitution and with art. 37 line 1 of Law
47/1992, revised, the Constitutional Court ensures the compliance with the procedure for the election of
Romania’s President (Law no. 370, 2004) and validates the results of the votes.
Within 24 hours from the validation of the presidential elections, the Presidents of the two Houses of
Parliament summon the deputies and senators in an ordinary session for the vow taken by the candidate whose
election was validated.
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Similar regulations with those from Romania’s constitution are also to be found in the fundamental law
of France. Thus, according to art. 58, the Constitutional Council ensures the compliance with the procedure for
the President’s election, examines contestations and validates the results of the vote.
With regard to the presidential elections, the Council determines the list of candidates who will take part
in the election process based on the suggestions submitted to it.
The Constitutional Council is the body which decides and validates the results of the elections, which
are published in the Official Gazette, at the same time with the patrimonial status of the candidate, according to
the law regarding the direct election of the President (Loi no. 62-1292, 1962).
In the French doctrine, it has been noticed the fact that the constitutional judges who register the
candidates for presidential elections, who validate the results of the elections and have attributions regarding the
electoral litigation “are in a delicate situation vis-à-vis the executive power, the more delicate as this particular
power is at the origin of their appointment” (Mastor Wanda, Hourquebie Fabrice, 2012, p. 1).
5. The control of compliance with the procedure regarding the organization and performance of the
referendum and validation of its results
In Romania, the relationships between the President and the constitutional court are reflects in the
dispositions of art. 146 letter i), in agreement with which the Constitutional Court ensures compliance with the
procedure for the organization and implementation of the referendum – procedure initiated by the President,
according to art. 90 of the Constitution – and validates its results (Law no. 3, 2000).
With regard to the enforcement of the dispositions of art. 90 of the Constitution pertaining to the
organization of a consultative referendum, on November 25th, 2007, the President – after the consultation of the
Parliament – organized a national referendum regarding the introduction of the uninominal vote for the election
of the members of Romania’s Parliament. The Constitutional Court fails to validate this referendum, as the
participation quorum was not reached, as requested by art. 5 line 2 of the law regarding the organization and
implementation of the referendum, with its subsequent modifications.
On November 22nd, 2009 took place both the elections for Romania’s President and the national
referendum to consult the people’s will on two issues: the existence of a bicameral parliament and the reduction
of the parliament’s members to maximum 300.
The simultaneous performance of the presidential elections and of a national referendum initiated by the
head of state was possible due to the opinion expressed on the matter by the Constitutional Court.
In France, the President may organize several types of referendum. Thus, art. 11 line 1 of the Constitution
stipulates the legislative referendum. Beside this popular consultation, following which the people adopts a bill in
specific domains, the President organizes a constitutional referendum (art. 89 line 2 of the Constitution) –
through which a law of revising the Constitution enters into force – or a referendum regarding any bill
authorizing the ratification of a treaty regarding the adhesion of a state to the EU (art. 88-5 of the Constitution).
In the case of these two last forms of popular consultation, the head of state may avoid the organization of a
referendum by convening into Congress the two Assemblies, which will have to decide with the vote of three
fifths of the total number of members.
With regard to the way of implementing the operations related to the referendum, the Government calls on
the Constitutional Council, which gives notice on all the measures taken to this purpose.
The Council examines and rules definitively for all contestations addressed to it. If certain breaches are
found in the performance of specific operations, the Council is entitled to appreciate, depending on their nature
and seriousness, whether to maintain those operations or to annul them partially or totally. Finally, the court of
constitutional litigation proceeds with the communication of the results of the referendum, also mentioned in the
decree regarding the promulgation of the law adopted by the people.
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6. Consulting the Constitutional Council in extraordinary circumstances
According to art. 16 line 1 of the French Constitution, the President is bound to consult the
Constitutional Council regarding the exceptional situation that has occurred. In this case, the Council meets at
once and issues a notification – motivated and published – regarding the fulfillment of the conditions requested in
the fundamental act. The head of state also informs the Council regarding the measures deemed necessary in such
a circumstance; with regard to these measures, the constitutional court pronounces itself at once through a
notification.
In the enforcement of art. 16 of the Constitution in April 1961, after the civil war in Algeria, the
Constitutional Council gave a favorable notification to the initiative of President Charles de Gaulle to govern
through decrees with legislative character. In the grounds invoked – which were never published, as a matter of
fact – the Council argued that the “normal functioning” of the constitutional public powers must be construed
reasonably, including the ability of the government to carry out its decisions, “an ability the executive, evidently,
fails to enjoy” (Harisson Martin, 1963, p. 140).
7. The assessment of the circumstances that justify the interim in the exercise of the office of presidency
In Romania, according to art. 146 letter g) corroborated with art. 45 of Law 47/1992 with its subsequent
modifications, the Constitutional Court assesses – with a majority vote of the judges – the existence of
circumstances that justify the interim in the exercise of the office of presidency in Romania and communicates
the findings to the Parliament and the Government.
The application for the assessment of the existence of circumstances that justify the interim of the office
of presidency in Romania needs  to be accompanies by the necessary proofs and is submitted by the head of state
only in the event the interim of this office is due to a temporary incapacity of the President to perform his/her
attributions.
In the event of a suspension of a head of state, the application is submitted to the Court by the president
who presided the works of the common séance of the two Houses of Parliament, based on the decision adopted in
common séance (art. 44 line 3 of Law no. 47,1992).
In France, according to art. 7 of the Constitution, the vacancy off the presidential office and the
impossibility of exercising the attributions by the head of state are assessed by the Constitutional Council, which
pronounces itself on the matter with the absolute majority of its members. Therefore, the constitutional court
stipulates that the President’s attributions – except the initiation of a legislative referendum and the dissolution of
the National Assembly – are temporarily exercised by the President of the Senate or, in the event the latter is also
in the incapacity to exercise these attributions, by the Government. The Council also declares that starting on this
date the Government may organize the ballot for the new presidential elections.
8. Settlement of legal conflicts of a constitutional nature among public authorities
The settlement of legal conflicts of a constitutional nature among public authorities by the constitutional
court was introduced in the constitutions of states after the second world war, for creating a “protection
instrument of political minorities and, more precisely, of the parliamentary opposition” (Carpentier Ēlise, 2007,
p.824), on the political level, and a “shield against tyrannies, an instrument that should guarantee a complete
separation of powers in the state” (Idem, p. 831), on the legal level. However, these high desiderates proved
harder in practice, because of the inefficiency of this means of protecting the Constitution in the periods of severe
crisis, of confusion of powers.
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In Romania, the relationships between the President and the Constitutional Court have been most
evidently put forward through a new attribution granted to the Constitutional Court after the 2003 revision of the
Constitution – the settlement of legal conflicts of a constitutional nature among public authorities. This duty of
the Constitutional Court was exercised starting with 2005 (Decision no. 53, 2005, Decision no. 435, 2006), the
constitutional judge adopting either a diplomatic position, or a reserved or even arbitrary one in the pronounced
decisions which “shattered more or less the balance of powers, reflecting its tendency to “collaborate with the
Parliament” in the performance of the legislative function of the state, thus ignoring the principle of the
separation of powers within the state” (Vrabie Genoveva, 2009, p. 9).
The Court itself, in a series of decisions, explains the meaning conferred by the Constitution to this new
attribution, which was initially defined in the decision regarding the constitutionality of the legislative proposal to
revise Romania’s Constitution (Decision no. 148, 2003). Thus, in the case of legal conflicts of a constitutional
nature “the conflicts of authority (or organic litigation) are involved”. In such a case, the Constitutional Court
settles or mediates constitutional litigation among the authorities. These disputes may refer to conflicts between
two or more constitutional authorities regarding the content of scope of application of their attributions that
derive form the Constitution. This is a necessary measure, aiming at removing possible institutional blockages.
The Court also stipulates the fact that these refer only to “institutional blockages, namely positive or negative
conflicts related to competence”. Thus, political conflicts in which the Court may find itself caught up in the
exercise of such a competence are excluded. In fact, the most important constitutional organisms make use of this
modality which becomes, consequently, extrema ratio, because on the political level they failed to find solutions
to solve or mediate the problem through political compromise.
In a first decision pronounced as an application of the attribution granted by art. 146 letter e) of the
Constitution, the Court states that “a legal conflict of a constitutional nature among public authorities involves
concrete acts or actions through which an authority or several authorities assume powers, attributions or
competences which, according to the Constitution, belong to other public authorities, or the omission of certain
public authorities consisting in declining competence or refusal to fulfill certain acts that fall in their range of
obligations” (Decision no. 53, 2005). In another decision (Decision no. 97, 2008), the Court states that: “the legal
conflict of a constitutional nature exists between two or several authorities and may refer to the content or an
extension of their attribution that derive from the Constitution, which makes them conflicts of competence,
positive or negative, and may lead to institutional blockages”. Therefore, it is about the existence of disputed
related to the exercise of duties by various state organisms (competence conflicts) which may paralyze the
collaboration among institutions and thus lead to serious fissures in the exercise of power on the legislative,
executive or jurisdictional level. In another case, the Court will specify that it has the competence “to settle the
fond of any legal conflict of a constitutional nature appeared between public authorities and not only the conflicts
of competence that may arise” (Decision no. 270, 2008).
We can notice the fact that out of all the decisions pronounced in the enforcement of this competence
the President was involved most often, finding himself in conflict with various public authorities, which led to a
clear deterioration of the relationships of the head of state with the main state organisms.
In Andorra, in its quality as head of state – together with the Bishop of Urgell from Spain – the French
President may notify the Constitutional Court for the settlement of competence conflicts between constitutional
organisms. As an element of originality in the fundamental act of Andorra, its content stipulates that “there is a
competence conflict when one of these (state organisms previously mentioned) invokes the illegitimate exercise
of competences granted by the Constitution by another organism”. By law, the cases when there is such a conflict
will be determined. As a rule, in the state in which the supreme law grants such an attribution to the court of
constitutional litigation, the notion of “competence conflict” is not defined, leaving it to the latitude of the
Constitutional Court to explain this concept – using jurisprudence – as it happened in Romania, for instance.
In the French Constitution the Constitutional Council is not granted the task of settling legal conflicts of
a constitutional nature among public authorities.
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9. Conclusions
Following the analysis of the constitutional dispositions that settle the relationships between the
President and the Constitutional Court or Council in Romania and France, we can make a series of observations.
Thus, we notice the fact that in Romania the claim of non-constitutionality made by the head of state
only refers to a law adopted by the Parliament, prior to its promulgation. In France, as well as in Andorra (where
the French president acts as head of state) the claim of non-constitutionality may have as an object both a law and
an international commitment, prior to its ratification. The Constitutional Council also controls ex officio all the
bills initiated by the President and subject to the people’s approval using the legislative referendum stipulated by
art. 11 of the Constitution; however, the constitutional court declined competence in the case of revision
initiatives of the fundamental act, which are subject to the control of constitutionality exercised ex officio by the
Constitutional Court of Romania.
We also notice that, following the analysis of certain decisions of the Constitutional Council to partially
repeal a law, thee President proceeded, arbitrarily in certain cases, with the execution of such decisions, thus
breaching the provisions of the fundamental act.
One of the most important attributions of the Constitutional Court of Romania – introduced by the 2003
revision of the Constitution – and whose exercise determined an evident increase of the role of the constitutional
court in the Romanian institutional landscape is the settlement of legal conflicts of a constitutional nature among
public authorities. Most of the times the court was called upon to settle such legal conflicts of a constitutional
nature, the Constitutional Court took an extremely reserved stance, thus provoking much criticism on behalf of
the doctrine.
We consider this attitude of the Constitutional Court of failing to admit the existence of a tensed
situation caused by the President in his relationships with other public authorities as arbitrary, at least, if not
wholly contrary to the provisions of the fundamental act, particularly in the light of the role the court of
constitutional jurisdiction as “warranty of the supremacy of the Constitution”.
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